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Abstract—Motivated by reliability of networks in critical
infrastructures, we consider optimal robustness of a class of
flow networks against a targeted attack, namely max-load
targeted attack, that triggers cascading failures due to removal
of largest load carrying portion of lines. The setup involves a
network of N lines with initial loads L1, . . . , LN , drawn from
independent and identical uniform distribution, and redun-
dancies S1, . . . , SN to be allocated. In the failure propagation
mechanism, a line fails initially due to attack and later due
to overloading. The load that was carried at the moment of
failing gets redistributed equally among all remaining lines in
the system. We analyze robustness of this network against the
max-load targeted attack that removes the largest load carrying
p-fraction of the lines from the system. The system designer
allocates Si as a stochastic function of the load in each line.
Assuming an average resource budget, we show that allocating
all lines the free-spaces equally among nodes is optimal under
some regulatory assumptions. We provide numerical results
verifying that equal free-space allocation to all lines performs
optimally in more general targeted attack scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a variety of networks, including power line networks,
financial networks and transportation networks, dynamical
interactions are observed in the form of dynamic flows. In
flow networks, an event of at least one failure of a line can
trigger other failures and, as a consequence, a significant
portion of lines in the network may fail in the form of cascad-
ing failures. Robustness of flow networks against cascading
failures is an active research topic and has received interest
from the academic community [1]–[6]. The references [4]–
[6] consider power networks where the failure mechanism is
the equal redistribution of load upon the failure of a power
line. In this paper, we address a similar issue in flow networks
and consider cascading failures in a democratic fiber bundle-
like model. In particular, we build upon our recent work
[7], [8] and extend existing understanding on robustness of
flow networks to the case of malicious targeted attacks. This
research also broadly contributes to the large body of work
on information dissemination and influence propagation [9]–
[13], percolation [14]–[16] and robustness [17]–[20].
In the problem setting, there are N lines with initial loads
L1, . . . , LN and free-spaces S1, . . . , SN . The maximum flow
allowed on a line i is its capacity, and is given by Ci =
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Li+ Si. When a line fails due to overloading, it is removed
from the system and the load it was carrying (at the moment
of failing) gets redistributed equally among all remaining
lines in the system. We characterize the robustness of this
network against a malicious targeted attack that removes the
largest load carrying p-fraction of the lines from the system.
We consider a metric that measures the average number
of lines that survive the cascade of failures over all possible
attack sizes reminiscent of the one proposed in [21]. In con-
trast to the previous work, current work focuses on the max-
load targeted attack scenario where the adversary chooses
the largest load carrying lines and removes them from the
system initially. We extend our previous work and show
under some regulatory conditions that among all allocations
as ordered stochastic functions of initial loads robustness
is maximized when all lines have the same redundancy
regardless of their initial loads. This extension comes with
pitfalls and challenges and we highlight and resolve them. In
particular, we investigate the order statistics of independent
and identically distributed random variables and extend the
results [11], [22], [8] to the max-load targeted attack.
In the rest of the paper, we explain the system model in
detail, develop the problem and our framework in Section
II. We then characterize the optimal robustness using our
framework in Section III. In Section IV we show applications
of the optimal robustness for targeted attacks. We conclude
our paper in Section V. As notation: When we mention
random variables (rvs), probability measure is denoted by
P, and corresponding expectation operator by E.
II. THE NETWORK MODEL AND THE PROBLEM
A. Network Model
We consider a network of N lines L1, . . . ,LN with initial
loads L = [L1, . . . , LN ] where L is an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random sequence with uniform
distribution over the interval [Lmin, Lmax] where Lmin > 0.
We denote the average load LB = E[Li] =
Lmin+Lmax
2 . The
capacity Ci of a line Li defines the maximum power flow
that can be carried by it, and is expressed as
Ci = Li + Si, i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
where Si denotes the free-space or redundancy allocated
to line Li. We denote the vector of free-spaces as S =
[S1, . . . , SN ]. where Si ≥ Smin for some Smin ≥ 0.
B. Max-Load Targeted Attack and Initial Load Redistribution
A targeted attack at time t = 0, which we call max-load
targeted attack, removes the largest load-carrying p-fraction
of the lines. After the attack, the amount of load on each
surviving line is given by its initial load plus its share of
the total load of the failed lines. When a line fails due to an
attack or its load exceeding its capacity, it is removed from
the system and the load it was carrying (at the moment of
failing) gets redistributed equally among all surviving lines.
The load redistribution process continues recursively until
no further failures occur, generating a cascade of failures.
n∞(p) denotes the final (i.e., steady-state) fraction of sur-
viving lines when a p-fraction of lines are attacked initially.
n∞(p) is monotone decreasing in p. We are interested in the
large graph asymptotic as N →∞.
The increase in the initial load of every surviving line due
to the initial attack is denoted by Q0(p) ≥ 0. Here, Q0(p)
represents the asymptotic average extra load that has to be
carried by surviving lines with respect to the randomness
in L. We denote the kth order statistic of the sequence
{L1, . . . , LN} as L(k:N):
L(1:N) ≤ L(2:N) ≤ . . . ≤ L(N :N) (2)
More precisely, the max-load targeted attack of size p incurs
an additional load to the surviving lines as:
Q
(r)
0 (p) , lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=N−⌊pN⌋+1
L(k:N)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=N−⌊pN⌋+1
E[L(k:N)] , Q0(p) (3)
where we assume ⌊pN⌋ lines are attacked. Here, Q
(r)
0 (p)
represents the random asymptotic time average extra load
(is a random variable parametrized by p) and Q0(p) is its
expected value (is a real number parametrized by p). We
also denote Q(r,N)(p) , 1
N
∑N
k=N−⌊pN⌋+1 L(k:N) as the
finite time average random extra load. Existence of the limit
in (3) is established by using the law of large numbers for
order statistics [23, Theorem 3] with an underlying uniform
distribution of loads as well as using superadditivity of
the sequence {
∑N
k=N−⌊pN⌋+1 E[L(k:N)]} with N and using
Fekete’s lemma [24]. Note that Q0(0) = 0 and Q0(p) is
monotone increasing, bounded and continuous with
Q0(p) ≤ Q0(1) = LB (4)
We also define F (p) , Q0(p)1−p , which will be useful in the
analysis. Note that F (p) is monotone increasing since Q0(p)
is monotone increasing. Note also that F (p) = 0 at p = 0
and F (p) → ∞ for p → 1. As a result, F is invertible
over s ∈ [0,∞) with F−1(s) monotone increasing over s ∈
[0,∞).
C. Calculating Q0(p) and F (p)
Next, let us set Lmin = 0 and Lmax = 1 and assume that
Li ∼ U [0, 1]. In this case, it is well known that L(k:N) ∼
Beta(k,N − k + 1) where Beta(r, s) represents the Beta
distribution with parameters r and s with probability density
function:
pBeta(x) =
1
B(r, s)
xr−1(1− x)s−1, x ∈ (0, 1) (5)
where B(r, s) = (r−1)!(s−1)!(r+s−1)! . The mean value of Beta
distribution is known in closed form and we have:
E[L(k:N)] =
k
N + 1
(6)
This enables us to obtain Q0(p) as
Q0(p) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=(1−p)N+1
k
N + 1
= p−
p2
2
(7)
Note that we dropped ⌊.⌋ in the lower summation limit in
(7) as this causes no difference in the limit as N → ∞.
Consequently, we have
F (p) =
2p− p2
2− 2p
=
p
2(1− p)
+
p
2
(8)
We observe that F (p) in (8) is convex and monotone in-
creasing for all p ∈ (0, 1) as both p1−p and p are monotone
increasing and convex functions of p. By using proper scaling
and shifting, we can generalize this observation for any
uniform distribution over an arbitrary interval [Lmin, Lmax]:
Lemma 1 For uniformly distributed Li, F (p) =
Q0(p)
1−p is
convex over p ∈ (0, 1).
D. Failure Cascade Mechanism
To understand the failure cascade mechanism, we will
consider the fraction ft of lines that fail at time t = 0, 1, . . ..
The number of lines that are still alive at time t is then given
byNt = N(1−ft) for all t = 0, 1, . . .. The cascading failures
start with an attack that targets a fraction p of lines. Hence,
we have f0 = p. Upon the failure of these f0 lines, their
load will be redistributed to the remaining (1− f0)N lines,
with each remaining line receiving an equal portion of the
failed load. Since the attack of pN lines causes Q
(r,N)
0 (p)N
amount of load to be redistributed to the remaining lines, the
resulting extra load per alive line is thus given by
Q
(r,N)
0 (p)
(1−f0)
.
In the next stage, a line i that survives the initial attack fails
when its new load reaches its capacity:
Li +
Q
(r,N)
0 (p)
(1− f0)
≥ Li + Si,
or, equivalently Si ≤
Q
(r,N)
0 (p)
(1−f0)N
. Therefore, at stage t = 1, an
additional fraction of the lines that were alive at the end of
the initial stage fail. This yields
f1 = f0 +
#{i : Si ≤
Q
(r,N)
0 (p)
(1−f0)
, Li ≤ L⌊pN⌋:N}
(1 − f0)N
where #{ } notation is used to denote the cardinality of the
set { }. This process continues until there is no additional
line failure and the stopping condition is valid in almost sure
sense in view of the law of large numbers for order statistics.
E. Allocation of Si under Fixed Budget
The objective of the system designer is to maximize the
average number of surviving lines after the cascading failures
in the network
J(S) =
N∑
i=0
n∞(pi)mi (9)
for any network size N . Here, pi =
i
N
denotes the attack
size, i.e., the ratio of attacked lines, andmi denotes the prob-
ability of pi on the support set {0, 1/N, . . . , (N − 1)/N, 1}.
The vector of probabilities is m = [m0, . . . ,mN ]. The
defender wishes to maximize J by selecting the vector S.
Assumption 1 The probability of attack is monotone de-
creasing, i.e.:
mi ≥ mi+1, ∀i
This monotonicity reflects the fact that the attacker’s re-
sources can accommodate attacking larger number of lines
with smaller probability. The system designer has a fixed
budget for Si:
1
N
N∑
i=1
Si ≤ SB (10)
where SB is the average free-space budget available to the
system designer. The allocation of Si is performed as a
stochastic function of initial load Li only, and we denote
Si(Li) to reflect this stochastic dependence. This assumption
is in line with typical network settings such as [8], [11], [22],
[25]. We make the following general assumption common to
the referred network settings:
Assumption 2 Si is stochastically ordered with respect to
the initial loads Li; that is,
P[S > s|L = ℓ1] ≤ P[S > s|L = ℓ2], ∀s (11)
whenever ℓ1 ≤ ℓ2.
Note that this assumption encompasses the commonly ac-
cepted allocation Si = αLi. We solve the following robust-
ness optimization problem under Assumptions 1 and 2:
max
pi(Si|Li)
J(S)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
i=1
Si(Li) ≤ SB (12)
III. OPTIMAL ROBUSTNESS UNDER THE MAX-LOAD
TARGETED ATTACK
We will show that distributing the available free-space Si
as Si = SB for all i optimizes the robustness of the system
under the specified load and free-space constraints. Note
that since Si is a stochastic function of Li, the sequence
{Si} is i.i.d. as well. Next, in view of the fact that Si is
stochastically ordered, Q
(r)
0 (p) → Q0(p) almost surely and
cascading process may continue in the later stages, we have
the following inequality
n∞(p)
≤ (1− p)P
[
Si ≥
Q
(r,N)
0 (p)
1− p
|Li /∈ {largest ⌊pN⌋ Li}
]
≤ (1− p)P
[
Sk:N ≥
Q
(r,N)
0 (p)
1− p
, ∀k = 1, . . . , N − ⌊pN⌋
]
≤ (1− p)P
[
Si ≥
Q
(r)
0 (p)
1− p
]
= (1− p)P [S ≥ F (p)] (13)
where Sk:N denotes the kth order statistic of the sequence
{S1, . . . , SN}. In view of (13), it suffices to work on a single
random variable S representing the sequence of free-space
allocations. In particular, we wish to show that among all
stochastic functions of Li, distributing {Si} using the Dirac-
delta distribution δ(s− SB) is optimal. To this end, we first
impose the condition that Si takes value from the set S =
{k ∈ N : F ( k
N
)}. Note that if Si = SB , then the final
system size under this discrete Dirac-delta distribution is
nδ,∞(p) =
{
1− i
N
if i
N
< p⋆δ
0 if i
N
≥ p⋆δ
(14)
where the critical attack size p⋆δ is given by
p⋆δ = ⌊F
−1(SB)⌋.
In view of (14), the desired result will follow if we show
N∑
i=0
n∞(pi)mi ≤
Np⋆δ∑
i=0
(1− pi)mi (15)
We will get the desired result (15) if we can show
N∑
i=0
(1− pi)P [S ≥ F (pi)]mi ≤
Np⋆δ∑
i=0
(1 − pi)mi,
or, equivalently that
N∑
i=Np⋆
δ
+1
(1− pi)P [S ≥ F (pi)]mi
≤
Np⋆δ∑
i=0
(1 − pi)P [S < F (pi)]mi. (16)
Since 1− p is monotone decreasing over the range 0 ≤ p ≤
1, mi is monotone decreasing, and both P [S ≥ F (p)] and
P [S < F (p)] are non-negative, (16) will follow if we can
show
N∑
i=Np⋆
δ
+1
P [S ≥ F (pi)] ≤
Np⋆δ∑
i=0
P [S < F (pi)] ,
or, equivalently that
N∑
i=0
P [S ≥ F (pi)] ≤
Np⋆δ∑
i=0
1 = Np⋆δ + 1, (17)
Note that since Si is allowed to take value in S, the left hand
side of (17) is equivalent to
1
N
N∑
i=0
P [S ≥ F (pi)] =
∫ 1
0
P [S ≥ F (p)] dp (18)
This follows from the fact that S is a discrete random variable
with support over S and Riemann integral with any spacing
of the form 1
nN
with n ∈ N yields 1
N
∑N
i=0 P [S ≥ F (pi)].
Next, we make a change of variables x = F (p) and write∫ 1
0
P [S ≥ F (p)] dp =
∫ ∞
0
P [S ≥ x] d
(
F−1(x)
)
(19)
= P [S ≥ x]F−1(x)
∣∣∞
x=0
−
∫ ∞
0
F−1(x)d(P [S ≥ x])
=
∫ ∞
0
F−1(x)d(P [S ≥ x]) (20)
= E
[
F−1(S)
]
≤ F−1(SB) (21)
where we use integration by parts in (19), the fact that Si ≥
F (pc) for all i in (20) and apply Jensen’s inequality for the
function F−1(x) over the interval x ∈ (0,∞) to reach (21)
since it is concave in x over this interval. Combining the
results, we conclude that
N∑
i=0
P [S ≥ F (pi)] ≤ NF
−1(SB) = Np
⋆
δ (22)
≤ Np⋆δ + 1 (23)
This establishes (17) and the desired result (15) follows
in view of the preceding arguments. We established the
following:
Theorem 1 For uniformly distributed Li, S
∗
i = SB for all i
is optimal for (12).
Note that the solution in above theorem bears the meaning
that irrespective of the initial load distribution, identical
allocation of the free-space to all lines is optimal. In other
words, the robustness is maximized by choosing a line’s
capacity Ci through Ci = Li + SB no matter what its load
Li is.
A. General Load Distributions and Bounds on Order Statis-
tics
In general, deriving analytic results to work with the order
statistics is not an easy task. In order to calculate E[L(k:N)],
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Fig. 1. We plot F (p) resulting from the upper bound in (25) for different σL
and fixed µL.
one has to compute the following integral:
E[L(k:N)]
=
∫ ∞
0
xpL(x)
(
N − 1
k − 1
)
PL(x)
k−1(1 − PL(x))N−kdx
(24)
and closed form expressions for this integral are not in
general available. Moreover, as the network size N grows,
the term
(
N−1
k−1
)
becomes hard to obtain let alone the whole
integral. We, therefore, observe that it requires significant
numerical effort to obtainQ0(p) especially when the network
size N is large and the distribution of Li is arbitrary. These
issues add to the difficulty of generalizing law of large
numbers for arbitrary distributions. In order to obtain a more
tractable analysis, we next use the upper bound for E[L(k:N)]
from [26, Eq. (2)], which is attributed originally to reference
[27] and known to be tight for some distributions
E[L(k:N)] ≤ µL + σL
√
k − 1
n− k + 1
(25)
where µL is the mean and σL is the variance of the dis-
tribution of Li. We approximate E[L(k:N)] using the bound
in (25). In Fig. 1, we plot the function F (p) resulting from
using the upper bound in (25) in the calculation of Q0(p) in
(3). It is observed numerically that increasing the mean value
µL decreases the critical value p
c for which the function
F (p) turns convex. In contrast, increasing the value of the
standard deviation σL increases p
c. Still, in our numerical
results we observe that the value of pc remains minor with
respect to the mean µL especially when the variance σ
2
L
is moderately small. Hence assuming the convex portion
of F (p) for analysis does not yield restriction. We also
corroborate this behavior through extensive numerical results
using the exact form in (24) for various distributions.
B. Recovering Optimal Robustness under Random Attacks
In our recent work [8], we consider random attacks and we
show that under a statistical distribution on loads Li and free-
spaces Si, a Dirac delta distribution at E [S] is optimal irre-
spective of the distribution of L, generalizing the approaches
in [11], [22] for the general robustness metric
∫ 1
0
n∞(p)dp.
The framework in the current paper is a generalization of
[8] for the max-load targeted attack. In order to recover the
previous results, let us assume that the attacker “randomly”
removes a pi =
i
N
fraction of lines (i.e., removes all possible
i lines with equally likely probability) from the system. Then,
the extra load incurred to the remaining 1−pi portion of lines
is Q0(pi) = piLB . In this case, the function F (p) is
F (p) =
pLB
1− p
(26)
We observe that F (p) in (26) is strictly convex for all p ∈
(0, 1). Following the steps in Theorem 1, we can guarantee
that distributing Si = SB for all i maximizes robustness in
(9). Our analysis also guarantees that convergence observed
in the mean-field analysis in [8] is in almost sure sense.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The results presented in the paper are based on a model
with a mean field assumption in that when a line fails, its
load gets redistributed globally and equally among all active
lines in the network. This mean field assumption may not
hold for networks with possible local redistribution behavior
such as power networks. On the other hand, models based on
exclusive local redistribution cannot capture the long-range
nature of physical laws. Consequently, a model where the
failed load is redistributed both locally and globally would be
more suitable. In addition, we assume a uniform distribution
of loads in order to be able to invoke law of large numbers for
order statistics. In this section, we perform simulations under
a topology-based redistribution model with loads having
distributions other than uniform. We wish to test how the
derived optimal scheme of equal free-space distribution holds
when the load associated with failed nodes is redistributed (at
least in part) locally according to a network topology under
different load distributions.
In the spirit of the redistribution models presented in [25],
[28], we consider a topology based redistribution model
that combines both local and global redistribution behaviors.
This extended model gauges the locality of the redistribution
by the parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] and the network topology
is generated as an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph G(n,N). At each
stage, the portion of the load that is not absorbed from
each failed line is divided into two parts: γ-fraction is
redistributed locally among neighboring lines (with each
neighbor receiving an equal portion), and (1− γ)-fraction is
redistributed equally among all surviving lines (irrespective
of topology). In this model, setting γ = 0 recovers the mean-
field model introduced in Section II, while setting γ = 1
gives a merely topology based redistribution model. We
compare the robustness of this system with respect to the
following metric:
R =
1
N
N∑
i=1
n∞(pi) (27)
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Fig. 2. We let L1, . . . , LN be obtained from Weibull distribution with
Lmin = 1 and k, λ such that E [L] = 2 and S = 1.74L. For γ = 0,
γ = 0.6, and γ = 1.0, the robustness R is plotted with respect to the shape
parameter k.
where pi =
i
N
. We run simulations for loads with Weibull
distributions with fixed E [L] and E [S] while varying the
scale parameter k of the distribution and compare robustness
with respect to R.
For this new redistribution model, we perform simulations
where we set the number of nodes to n = 250 and number of
edges as N = 8400, and create a random network according
to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi G(n,N) model. This leads to each line
having on average 132 neighbors. The loads {L1, . . . , LN}
are drawn from i.i.d. Weibull distribution (with Lmin = 1
and k, λ such that E [L] = 2) and the free spaces are set as
Si = 1.74Li. We run 100 independent experiments for each
parameter set, and report the average value of the robustness
metric defined in (27). The results of simulations are shown
in Fig. 2 for γ = 0, γ = 0.6 and γ = 1. We observe that R
is maximized in the limiting case k →∞. This observation
points to the optimality of Dirac delta distribution since
the Weibull distribution approaches the Dirac delta function
as k grows large. These numerical findings show that the
uniform allocation among the loads, in the case of the max-
load targeted attack under Weibull distributed loads with
possible (partial) local load redistribution, performs well
even when the redistribution of the loads on failing lines are
performed based on the topology of the network. Note also
that increasing the locality parameter γ decreases robustness,
which is in line with our earlier findings in [8] for randomly
generated attacks.
We finally test the effect of node degree on the robustness
of the network. We consider the Erdo˝s-Re´nyiG(n,N) model
with the same number of nodes n = 250 and a smaller num-
ber of edges N = 625. In this case, each line has 8 neighbors
on average. The results are presented in Fig. 3 for γ = 0,
γ = 0.25, γ = 0.6 and γ = 1, respectively. We observe
that the robustness of the network improves irrespective of
locality parameter γ. Additionally, when compared to the
results in Fig. 2, we observe that robustness is affected by the
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Fig. 3. We repeat the experiments in Fig. 2 for γ = 0.25, γ = 0.6, and
(c) γ = 1.0, under a different Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with significantly smaller
average number of neighbors and provide comparison of random and targeted
attack scenarios. We also include the comparison for γ = 0 case.
connectivity of the network in different ways for different γ.
In particular, the drop in robustness with γ is more significant
for a loosely connected network.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated the optimal robustness for a
class of flow networks against cascading failures under max-
load targeted attacks that remove the largest load carrying
p-fraction of the lines. In the following stages of the failure
cascade mechanism, a line is removed due to overloading.
The load that was carried at the moment of failing gets
redistributed equally among all remaining lines in the system
while the rest of the load is lost. Assuming an average
resource constraint on free-space Si, we show that among all
possible allocations as ordered stochastic functions of loads
the optimum is achieved when all lines are allocated the same
free-spaces under some conditions.
Our current results reveal that the methodology developed
in [8] can be extended to deal with max-load targeted attacks.
In future work, we will focus on understanding the critical
attack size necessary to disrupt the whole network and
the resulting tri-critical behavior. We will also extend our
framework to understand the attacker-defender interactions
in single and multiple stages of the cascade formation in
multiple interdependent networks by devising necessary cost
structures.
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